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Berislav Marušić and John Schwenkler* 
 
It is a special and hard problem to understand how evidence figures into the reasoning of 
an agent. It is a problem for philosophers but also one we all encounter in our daily lives. Our 
aim in this chapter is to identify the problem and outline a possible solution to it.1 
 
1. The Problem 
 In a nutshell, the problem that agents face is how to consider evidence in their decision-
making without taking it as grounds for a prediction, that is, without turning their decision into 
an estimate of what they are going to do.2 
Let us illustrate this with an example. Imagine that you are considering running a 
marathon with a limited number of starting places.3 The starting places are assigned through a 
lottery. Now suppose that consideration of your chances reveals the following: Your chance of 
getting a starting place is pretty good—say 80%. Your chance of actually running the marathon, 
conditional on getting a starting place and the world cooperating with your plans, is also pretty 
good—say also 80%. If a well-informed bookie were offering bets on whether (a) you would get 
																																																						
* Both authors contributed equally to this work. 
1 For further discussion, see Marušić (2012; 2013; 2015), Marušić and Schwenkler (2018), and Schwenkler 
(2019, Chs. 5-7). The present discussion synthesizes and builds upon that work.  
2 This use of “estimate” is due to Anscombe (1963/2000, 2). The problem is sometimes discussed in decision 
theory in terms of the question of whether deliberation crowds out prediction. See Spohn (1977), Levi (1997; 2007); 
Rabinowicz (2002), Joyce (2002), Hájek (2016), Vavova (2016), Liu and Price (2019). We think that, with the 
exception of Vavova (2016), those discussions don’t quite get to the heart of our problem, because they fail to 
distinguish the problem as it arises for decision theory from the problem as it arises for the ordinary agent. Our topic 
here is the latter. 
3 This example organizes the argument of Marušić (2015). 
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a starting place in the lottery, and whether (b) you would actually run the marathon, conditional 
on getting a starting place and the world cooperating, they would offer the very same odds for 
both.  
The problem is that you cannot consider the question of whether you will actually run the 
marathon in the same way as that of whether you will get a starting place through the lottery. As 
an agent, you must face the respective uncertainties in two very different ways. That is because 
whether you get a starting place in the race is not up to you, and so you can’t decide to get a 
starting place. You have to make your decision to run the marathon conditional on winning a 
starting place in the lottery—and, in general, conditional on the world’s cooperation. But 
whether you actually run the marathon is, we may suppose, entirely up to you. (Let us ignore the 
possibility of getting injured, or sick, or hit by a car or a meteorite. Though some of these things 
are to some extent up to you, they also involve ways in which the world must cooperate.) And if 
it is entirely up to you whether you actually run the marathon, then you cannot make your 
decision to run it conditional on—your running the marathon! You have to regard the uncertainty 
that arises from the possibility of deciding not to run the marathon in a different way than the 
uncertainty that arises from the possibility of not getting a starting place, or of the world not 
cooperating with your choice. The fact that it is up to you whether you actually run the marathon 
makes a difference to how you should think of the evidence concerning whether you will 
actually do this. 
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that, since it is up to you to run the 
marathon, you needn’t consider evidence concerning the difficulty of following through. You 
cannot make a good decision if you ignore how difficult it is to actually run a marathon. You 
must consider the fact that running a marathon will require resolve and persistence. So, if you 
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make a good decision, you will take the difficulty into account in considering both which ends 
you set for yourself and which means you choose to achieve them. That is to say, you will 
consider whether this difficult project is really worth the effort. And, if you decide that it is, you 
will consider how best to pull it off: You will train hard in advance of the race, and you will be 
mindful of the need for resolve during the race. In this way, you will not ignore the evidence of 
difficulty. But you will also not use it as the basis for prediction. 
The problem is to say how you should consider this evidence, without using it as grounds 
for prediction of your future behaviour. In what way can you reason about the possibility that 
you will fail to do something that it is up to you to do?4 
 
2. Answer I: Decision Theory 
A first answer might be suggested by decision theory: The rationality of a decision is a 
function of both preferences and probabilities. In making a decision, an agent has to take into 
account both how much they prefer the possible outcomes of their actions and how probable 
those outcomes are, conditional on performing those actions. 
However, we do not think that this is an adequate answer, for two reasons. First, this view 
does not really address the problem we have identified. Second, it leads to incoherence between 
an agent’s practical and theoretical conclusions.5  
																																																						
4 The question here bears on the extensive discussion of the case of Professor Procrastinate from Jackson and 
Pargetter (1986). See Goldman (1976), Portmore (2011; 2019) Ross (2012) and Jackson (2014). The view defended 
here has affinities with Thomason (1981) and Liu and Price (2019).  
5 A further problem is that, on this view, there is no resting place for practical thinking, because the fact that one 
is making a decision (on certain grounds) affects the probability assignment of the outcomes. Since the outcomes are 
not independent of one’s decisions, it is not clear how the decision-theoretic approach applies. We won’t pursue this 
problem here. The structure of the problem is nicely brought out by Bok (1998), albeit not in probabilistic terms. 
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Let us illustrate this with an example. Suppose you dramatically prefer to run a marathon, 
on the grounds that it will secure you abiding admiration from those you care about the most. 
You then set out to consider how to do it. And suppose you have three ways of pursuing your 
goal: First, you could set out to train on your own. Second, you could join a training group at a 
local gym. Third, you could join a training group and hire a personal trainer at the same local 
gym. (Note: You can only hire a personal trainer if you join the training group!) Needless to say, 
joining the local gym is expensive, and joining the gym as well as hiring a personal trainer is 
extremely expensive.  
If you went by your preferences alone, you would pursue your goal of running the 
marathon by training by yourself, thus saving yourself the money for a gym membership and a 
personal trainer. However, since you have to take into account the difficulty of running a 
marathon, decision theoretic calculation suggests that one of the other courses of action is the 
more rational one. Let us suppose that it is, in fact, joining a training group and foregoing a 
personal trainer, as the increase in costs for hiring the trainer do not justify the increase in odds 
of success. Finally, let us suppose that, in arriving at this conclusion, you have assigned 
probability 0.8 to the outcome of successfully running the marathon, conditional on joining a 
training group at the local gym.  
But now we can see the problem. In your decision theoretic calculations, you are doing 
nothing other than making predictions about your future actions—you are assigning probabilities 
to outcomes that are up to you. And our challenge was to articulate how to consider the 
uncertainty that arises about matters that are up to the agent is different from the uncertainty that 
arises about matters that are not up to the agent. The decision-theoretic approach has not done 
that. 
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Moreover, the decision-theoretic approach has also given rise to incoherence between 
your practical thought and your theoretical thought. On practical grounds, you have reached a 
conclusion that you might express by saying, “I will run the marathon by joining a training 
group.” But on purely theoretical grounds, you have reached a conclusion that you might express 
by saying, “There is an 80% chance that I will run the marathon by joining a training group.”6 
And that is odd. You are, in effect, committed to the conclusion that you might express by 
saying, “I will run the marathon, though there is a 20% chance that I won’t.” Your view of the 
future is incoherent.7 
 
3. Answer II: Practical Reasoning 
Suppose that you deliberate about whether to run the marathon in a way we might 
represent as follows: 
 
(1) There’s a marathon being held in my home city six months from now. 
Running the marathon will secure me abiding admiration from those I care about the 
most. 
If I enter to run, there’s an 80% chance that my name will be drawn in the lottery. 
It will also cost about $150 to register for the race if my name is drawn. 
In order to complete the entire race I’ll need to do a lot of training. 
																																																						
6 Assuming something like Lewis’s Principal Principle (e.g. Lewis 1994). 
7 One might reply by defending non-cognitivism about practical reason, according to which the conclusions of 
practical reasoning are not beliefs (e.g. Bratman 1987). However, even on a non-cognitivist view, there are 
coherence requirements on one’s intentions and beliefs, so that one’s overall view will be irrational. See Marušić 
(2013; 2015, Ch. 3.1) and Marušić and Schwenkler (2018) for further discussion.  
5 
I will be much better able to accomplish this if I join a training group rather than 
attempting to train on my own. 
However, joining the training group will be expensive, since it requires joining a gym. 
My household finances are in good enough shape to cover the $150 fee and the gym 
expenses, though it will be tight. 
So I’ll enter to run, pay the $150 fee if my name is drawn, join a training group to help 
me prepare, and then complete the race on the day it is run. 
 
Here, the “so” of your conclusion in the final sentence is an instance of what Jonathan Dancy 
(2018, 15) helpfully calls the “practical ‘so’”: It is part of an act in which a decision to do 
something is drawn from a body of considerations that one takes to rationalize or support it. The 
decision is a conclusion of practical reasoning.  
The hard question is: How are the considerations listed as premises in (1) supposed to 
support your drawing this conclusion? 
The first thing we should note is that the expression of your conclusion in (1) is shorthand 
for a judgment with a lot more internal complexity. That is, the decision you reach when your 
reasoning concludes is not the decision that, if your name is drawn in the lottery, you will do the 
things that it describes no matter what—that you will do them even if, say, your spouse has a 
medical emergency and your checking account is overdrawn, or the training group meets during 
your child’s weekly soccer games, or on the day of the race you have a seriously injured ankle. 
These conditional aspects of your intention, which have been explored in detail in important 
work by Luca Ferrero (2009), are left implicit in (1) but might be stated explicitly if they became 
contextually relevant—if someone were to ask, say, whether you really are going to run the 
6 
marathon if your injured ankle isn’t healed.8 This is what we earlier tried to capture by saying 
that the world must cooperate with your plans. 
The conclusion that you reach in (1) is not, however, even implicitly conditional on 
anything like your still wanting to run the marathon on the day it happens or to train for it during 
the months leading up to it. If the conclusion of your reasoning were conditional on things like 
those, then your conclusion would be better expressed by saying, e.g., that “I’ll think about 
running the marathon,” or “I’ll start training for the race and then see how I feel,” or something 
of that sort. But what accounts for this difference? Looking forward to your future, you can 
appreciate that there’s a non-zero chance both that (a) when the day of the marathon comes 
you’ll have sprained your ankle training and will decide not to run the race in order to avoid 
making the injury more serious; and that (b) when the day of the marathon comes you’ll strongly 
desire to sleep in and will decide not to run the race on those grounds. We may suppose that 
neither your injured ankle, nor your desire to skip the race, will prevent you from running in the 
way that, say, being kidnapped would do. Then why is the injury, but not the desire to bow out, 
something your decision can be conditional on? 
The answer is not simply that you are able to control your desires in a way that you 
cannot control your bodily health—for in fact the reasoning in (1) can be supplemented with 
further practical reasoning aimed at doing both of these things. For example, in anticipation of 
getting cold feet, you might reason as follows: 
 
(2) I’m likely to want to skip the race if I haven’t prepared mentally for it. 
																																																						
8 For further development of our view about this, see Marušić and Schwenkler (2018, §3.1). 
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So I’ll spend the week before the race watching films like Chariots of Fire and 
Prefontaine. 
 
Similarly, in anticipation of a possible injury, you might reason along these lines: 
 
(3) I’m likely to injure my ankle if I play pickup basketball. 
So I’ll also avoid playing pickup basketball until the marathon is past. 
 
In both cases, you reason practically in light of the conclusion you reached in (1). Indeed, it 
seems like a commitment to reasoning in ways like these is a rational requirement of being 
seriously committed to the conclusion of (1). In each case, however, it seems clear that your 
strategy for preventing the undesired outcome might fail to do the trick. We are back with the 
question asked earlier: Why is the potential injury, but not the potential desire to bow out, 
something that your decision to race the marathon can be conditional on? 
Here is a better answer: The difference between an injured ankle and a desire not to run is 
that only the former gives you any kind of reason not to run the race. If on the day of the race 
your ankle is injured, this gives you reason to sit the race out, because completing it would cause 
you severe pain, or risk making your injury more serious. By contrast, if on the day of the race 
you simply want to skip it, then this gives you no reason at all not to run, but only a reason to 
suck it up. Of course, if your desire not to run the race is itself well grounded, say because 
there’s been an emergency at home that needs your attention, then you have a reason not to run 
the race. But in that case the reason you have is not your desire itself, but rather the situation that 
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it is a response to. Simply wanting not to do something you’ve decided to do, gives you no reason 
at all to abandon your decision in favour of this desire. 
Let’s return to the question we asked originally. In virtue of what do considerations listed 
as premises in (1) put you in a position to draw the conclusion you do? That conclusion has the 
form of a statement about the future: You’d express it by telling someone, “I am going to enter 
the lottery to run the marathon, and train for the race and then run it if my name is drawn.” Yet 
how can you conclude this on the basis of the considerations that you reason from? 
To see how this is possible, let us compare the reasoning in (1) with reasoning that might 
proceed from the following considerations: 
 
(4) All the evidence indicates that Candidate X is going to enter the race. 
If she enters the race she will raise millions of dollars in campaign funds. 
If she raises millions in campaign funds she will have an 80% chance to win the primary. 
If she wins the primary she will win the general election. 
 
Imagine that on the basis of the considerations in (4) you draw a conclusion that you might 
express by saying, “Candidate X is going to enter the race, raise millions of dollars in campaign 
funds, and win the general election if she wins the primary.” This conclusion, just like your 
conclusion in (1), is a description of future events. Yet whereas the conclusion in (4) will be 
reasonable only if it is supported by sufficient evidence that this is what Candidate X is going to 
do, it seems reasonable for you to conclude as you do in (1) even if the considerations you reason 
from, or any others you might be able to appeal to, do not provide sufficient evidence that you’ll 
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act in the way described.9 That is because in reasoning as you do in (1), in contrast to (4), the 
conclusion that you draw is such as to depend on the reasoning in light of which you draw it. 
That is, when you reason as you do in (1), the question “Am I going to run the marathon?” is not 
a question that you treat as having an answer that it is the aim of your reasoning to discover. This 
is rather the way that you reason in (4), where Candidate X’s likely decisions, and her prospects 
in the election depending on what she decides, are matters that you treat as fixed, and that you 
aim in your reasoning to reflect.10 By contrast, when you reason about what you are going to do, 
the answer that you reach is supposed to be settled by the reasoning that leads you to it, not by 
some independent matters which that reasoning aims to reflect. Indeed, we can now see the error 
of predicting matters that are up to us: The error is to treat the subject matter as to be reflected in 
our reasoning rather than to be made so by it.11 
 
4. Practical Knowledge 
This final section will relate the position we have developed to a further thesis, frequently 
identified with the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, namely that practical reasoning about what to do 
gives an agent practical knowledge of what she is doing or is going to do. 
The version of this thesis that Anscombe herself explicitly endorses extends only to 
present action, insofar as this action is intentional: it says that practical reasoning is the ground of 
																																																						
9 You will, however, need to have adequate evidence for many of the premises you reason from—e.g. that the 
race is being held on such-and-such a date, that you have the money to pay the registration fee, etc.—but that is 
another issue. 
10 There is, of course, a general problem about how to understand rational belief and knowledge of the future, if 
the future is genuinely open. This is an issue we set aside. 
11 Velleman’s distinction between conclusions we accept “so as to reflect the truth“ and conclusions we accept 
“so as to create the truth” informs our present discussion (Velleman 1996, 195, n.55). However, we do not adopt the 
entirety of Velleman’s view. For differences, see Marušić (2015, Ch. 6.2). 
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practical, non-observational knowledge of what one is presently in the process of doing 
(Anscombe 1963, 11-12 and passim). But Anscombe brings her account of practical reasoning to 
bear on the topic of future action as well, claiming that statements of the form, “I am going to φ,” 
where they express intentions rather than estimates of one’s future behaviour, are grounded in 
reasons that do not suggest “what is probable, or likely to happen,” but rather in reasons 
“suggesting what it would be good to make happen with a view to an objective” (Anscombe 
1963/2000, 4). And other philosophers, most prominently David Velleman (1989/2007) and 
Kieran Setiya (2007; 2008) have treated belief about what one will do as a central element in 
their accounts of an agent’s practical knowledge.  
The account of practical reasoning that we have developed here suggests a way around a 
common objection to positions like Velleman’s and Setiya’s, namely that in positing an essential 
connection between intention and belief they demand that an agent make an epistemically 
unjustified “leap of faith” in forming the intention to do something.12 By contrast, a central 
element in our account is that beliefs about one’s future actions are necessarily not subject to the 
evidential norm governing beliefs about other matters. To the extent that your future actions are 
up to you to decide, they are such as to depend on the reasoning in light of which you decide this, 
which means there is not a requirement that they be supported by adequate evidence. 
However, we also hold that an agent’s practical reasoning does not always gives her 
practical knowledge that she will do what she decides.13 When, through practical reasoning, you 
conclude that you will run the marathon, you do not necessarily have practical knowledge that 
you will do so. That is because the fact that it is difficult to run the marathon may be evidence 
																																																						
12 See esp. Langton (2003) for this objection in response to Velleman (1989/2007).  
13 We take a similar position in regard to present action as well. For relevant arguments see Schwenkler (2015, 
17-25) and (2019, Ch. 6.4).   
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that defeats your practical knowledge, preventing you from knowing that you will act as you 
have decided. 
To see this, consider a very different kind of case, involving mathematical knowledge. 
Suppose you calculate something by longhand. Your calculation is accurate and you have made 
no mistake. It seems that you have a priori knowledge of the result of your calculation: Your 
knowledge of the result does not rest on evidence or observation but is grounded in the 
calculation alone. However, if you acquire evidence that there is a good chance that you made a 
mistake—say, because you often make mistakes when you perform such calculations, or because 
people who are in many respects like you often make mistakes, or because a bookie will offer 
bets that reflect a significant chance that you have made an error—this will defeat your a priori 
knowledge, even if your calculation was perfect. Analogously, the fact that there is a 20% chance 
that you will fail to run the marathon serves as a defeater for any potential practical knowledge 
you might have had. Your situation would be analogous to a case in which you proved 
something mathematically but had empirical evidence that you made a mistake. 
It is instructive to consider why this must be so.14 If our practical reasoning always had to 
conclude in practical knowledge in order to be good reasoning, there would be a constraint on 
the strength or significance of our reasons: reasons could speak in favour of φ-ing only if they 
put us in a position to know that will φ if we decide to φ. The resulting view of the strength or 
significance of our reasons would be implausible, because we may have overwhelming reasons 
to do something that is exceedingly difficult. We may strongly want, immensely value or even 
simply be obliged to do something, and this can make it practically rational to do it—but the fact 
that we desire or value or are obliged to do it need not put us in a position to know that we will 
																																																						
14 See Marušić (2015, esp. 115-116) and Schwenkler (2019, Ch.6.4) for further discussion.  
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do it, since the difficulty of doing it would be a defeater for our purported knowledge. 
The argument of the preceding section also shows that an agent is in a different position 
with respect to evidence about the difficulty of her intended actions than with respect to evidence 
concerning matters that are not up to her. For example, the fact that it will be difficult to run the 
marathon, due to the physical demands of the race as well as the challenge of keeping yourself 
sufficiently confident and motivated, is something you can account for in your practical 
reasoning by forming plans that will help you to overcome these difficulties. Yet plans like these 
cannot eliminate entirely the possibility of failing to do what you intend. In particular, they 
cannot eliminate the need for resolve in sticking to a decision in the face of temptations to 
abandon it. 
What is the right response to this limitation? It does not lie in saying “I’ll do it … unless I 
don’t” in any situation where the possibility of failure becomes salient—for as we have argued, 
this is to regard one’s intention as conditional on one’s future state of mind (cf. Anscombe 
1963/2000, §52). The moral is rather that, in making up our mind, we sometimes must be 
prepared to be resolute in the face of difficulty—even when we know that no bookie will think in 
the way that we do. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Kant’s famous dictum is that we act under the idea of freedom. In the present paper, we 
do not mean to make headway on the question of what freedom is. However, we hope to have 
shown that freedom has an important epistemological significance: It licenses us to think of the 
future in a distinctive way. In particular, when something is up to us, then no matter how hard it 
is for us to do it, what will happen is something for us to decide—and deciding is a practical 
13 
matter. We evade our responsibility if in those circumstances we seek to predict what will 
happen—and sometimes such evasion is couched in claims of theoretical rationality. As agents, 




Anscombe, G.E.M. (1963/2000). Intention, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000. 
Bok, Hilary. (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bratman, Michael. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Dancy, Jonathan. (2018). Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ferrero, Luca. (2009). “Conditional Intentions.” Noûs 43, 700–41. 
Goldman, Holly. (1976). “Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection.” The Philosophical Review 
85, 449–87. 
Hájek, Alan. (2016). “Deliberation welcomes prediction.” Episteme 13, 507–528. 
Jackson, Frank and Robert Pargetter. (1986). “Oughts, Options, and Actualism.” The 
Philosophical Review 95, 233–55. 
Jackson, Frank. (2014). “Procrastinate Revisited.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95, 634–47. 
Joyce, James. (2002). “Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one’s own 
actions.” Philosophical Studies 110, 69–102. 
14 
Langton, Rae. (2003). “Intention as Faith.” In Action and Agency, edited by Helen Steward. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Levi, Isaac. (2007). “Deliberation Does Crowd out Prediction.” In Hommage à Wlodek: 
Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, edited by Toni Rønnow-
Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson, Lund University. 
Levi, Isaac. (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of 
Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Lewis, David. (1994). “Humean Supervenience Debugged.” Mind, 103: 473–90. 
 
Liu, Yang and Huw Price. (2019). “Heart of DARCness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
97, 136–50. 
Marušić, Berislav and John Schwenkler. “Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong 
Cognitivism.” Analytic Philosophy 59.3 (2018): 1–32. 
Marušić, Berislav. (2015). Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Marušić, Berislav. (2013). “Promising against the Evidence.” Ethics 123, 292–317. 
Marušić, Berislav. (2012). “Belief and Difficult Action.” Philosophers' Imprint 12, 1–30. 
Portmore, Douglas. (2019). Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Portmore, Douglas. (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rabinowicz, Wlodek. (2002). “Does Practical Deliberation Crowd out Self-Prediction?” 
Erkenntnis 57, 91–122. 
15 
Ross, Jacob. (2012). “Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond.” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 
2, edited by Mark Timmons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schwenkler, John. (2019). Anscombe’s Intention: A Guide. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Schwenkler, John. (2015). “Understanding ‘Practical Knowledge’.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15, 1–
32. 
Setiya, Kieran. (2007). Reasons Without Rationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Setiya, Kieran. (2008). “Practical Knowledge.” Ethics 118, 388–409. 
Spohn, Wolfgang. (1977). “Where Luce and Krantz Do Really Generalize Savage’s Decision 
Model.” Erkenntnis 11, 113–34. 
Thomason, Richmond. (1981). “Deontic Logic and the Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation.” 
New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions and the Foundations of Ethics 152, 177–
86. 
Vavova, Katia. (2016). “Deliberation and Prediction: It’s complicated.” Episteme 13, 529–38. 
Velleman, David. (1989/2007). Practical Reflection, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 
Velleman, David. (1996). “The Possibility of Practical Reason.” In The Possibility of Practical 
Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 270-299. 
 
 
